| 2.3.1-3-1 Ensure hazards analysis is assessed for adequacy and completeness |
Phase A |
Phase B |
Phase C |
Phase D1 |
Phase D2 |
Phase D3 |
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A System Safety Hazard Analysis Report documents hazard analyses that are used to systematically identify and evaluate hazards both real and potential, for elimination or control.
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SFWC 1.1.3
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NA
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Mission Assurance Guide, TOR-2007(8546)-6018, Rev B, Systems Safety Assurance chapter; Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook, TOR-2006(8506)-4494, System Safety chapter; Mil-Std-882 System Safety Program Requirements; SMCI-63-1205, The SMC System Safety Programs or equivalent; AFI 91-202, The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program
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| 2.3.1-3-2 Ensure non-developmental items (including commercial off the shelf and government furnished equipment) intended use is consistent with design |
Phase A |
Phase B |
Phase C |
Phase D1 |
Phase D2 |
Phase D3 |
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Ensure non-developmental Items, including commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), Open Source Software (OSS), and government furnished equipment (GFE), are reviewed by system safety programs to ensure intended use is consistent with item design, and to ensure they introduce no additional system hazards.
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SFWC 1.1.3.1
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NA
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Mission Assurance Guide, TOR-2007(8546)-6018, Rev B, Systems Safety Assurance chapter; Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook,TOR-2006(8506)-4494, System Safety chapter; Mil-Std-882 System Safety Program Requirements; SMCI-63-1205 or equivalent, The SMC System Safety Programs or equivalent
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| 2.3.1-3-3 Ensure mishap risk assessments are conducted |
Phase A |
Phase B |
Phase C |
Phase D1 |
Phase D2 |
Phase D3 |
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Ensure the mishap risk assessments define the severity and probability of each identified hazard and assess potential impact of the hazard on personnel, facilities, equipment, operations, the public, the environment, and the system itself. The mishap risk mitigation processes should use the system safety design order of precedence: hazard elimination through design; design for minimum risk; incorporate safety devices; provide warning devices; and develop procedures and training.
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SFWC 1.1.3.2, SFWC 1.1.3.3
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NA
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Mil-Std-882 System Safety Program Requirements; SMCI-63-1205, The SMC System Safety Programs or equivalent; AFI 91-202, The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program
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| 2.3.1-3-4 Ensure contractor has analyzed user requirements documents for safety-related hazards and documented any identified hazards |
Phase A |
Phase B |
Phase C |
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Ensure that the hazards that the Preliminary Hazard Analysis indicated could impact safety will be mitigated if the system requirements are met. Review Concept of Operations, Capability Production Document, and Capability Description Document to ensure that any capabilities with safety impacts are clearly identified. This includes range safety, vehicle safety, and, when applicable, the safety of the system's end users. Operator safety is covered under HSI. At this level, hazards will pertain to the system and may not have been decomposed into software- or hardware-related hazards.
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NA
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NA
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MIL-STD-882C, Task 203 "Safety Requirements/Criteria Analysis", Task 201 "Preliminary Hazard List" and Task 202 "Preliminary Hazard Analysis"
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| 2.3.1-3-5 Ensure analyses of failure detection and recovery strategies cover identified safety-related hazards |
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Phase B |
Phase C |
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Ensure that safety-related hazards are assessed to a level commensurate with their probability and severity, as identified in the preliminary hazard assessment. This may involve a more detailed functional hazard assessment; a FMEA; cooperative vulnerability, penetration assessment and adversarial team baseline; an FMEA; or several analyses linked by a safety case.
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AFMAN 63-119 A12.1.8
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NA
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MIL-STD-882C Task 301"Safety Assessment"; MIL-STD-1629A Task 101 "Failure Modes and Effects Analysis" (tailored to include software), GEIA STD 009 Sections 5.5.1.6, 6.5.1.6, 7.5.1.6 "Identification of Failure Modes and Mechanisms", TOR-2008(1590)-7515, "Guideline for Conducting Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of Software Intensive Systems"; Adelard Safety Case Development (ASCAD) Manual, SMC-S-013/TOR-2007(8583)-6889 "Reliability Program for Space Systems"; AFMAN 63-119 or equivalent
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