| 2.3.2-5-1 Ensure Failure Modes Effects & Criticality Analysis is adequate |
Phase B |
Phase C |
Phase D1 |
Phase D2 |
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Ensure the preliminary FMECA analysis is assessed prior to PDR and the final FMECA analysis is assessed prior to CDR. Reassess the FMECA if any design changes occur post CDR. Ensure functional analysis of all units complete. Ensure analysis of interfaces between units (inter/intra- subsystem, inter-segment, and inter-system) complete. Ensure product and critical piece-part analyses are complete, as required, and incorporated into FMECA. Ensure critical items and critical processes are identified and controlled. Ensure limited life items are identified and found acceptable for mission use and duration.
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SFWC 2.2.2, SFWC 2.2.2.1, SFWC 2.2.2.2, SFWC 2.2.2.3, SFWC 2.2.2.4, SFWC 2.2.2.5, SFWC 2.2.2.6, SFWC 2.2.3.1
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NA
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Mission Assurance Guide, TOR-2007(8546)-6018, Rev B, Reliability Chapter; Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook, TOR-2006(8506)-4494,Chapter 21; TOR-2009(8591)-13, Space Vehicle Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis; SMC-S-013, Reliability Program for Space Systems, 13 June 2008 (also published as TOR-2007(8583)-6889 under same title) or equivalent; Design Advisory DA-2013-01
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| 2.3.2-5-2 Ensure all single-point failures are identified, mitigated, and verified |
Phase A |
Phase B |
Phase C |
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Ensure process is independently reviewed to evaluate effectiveness in identifying and controlling credible single point failures. Analysis should be fed into the critical items controls process to eliminate or control their effects. SPFs should be eliminated where practical for new designs if they cause loss or serious degradation of satellite on-orbit mission.
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SFWC 2.2.3
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NA
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TOR-2009(8591)-13, Space Vehicle Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis; Design Advisory DA-2013-01
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| 2.3.2-5-3 Ensure the functional FMECA is assessed |
Phase A |
Phase B |
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Ensure the functional diagram of the system or applicable portions includes response analysis of the system to failures.
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NA
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NA
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SMC-S-013, Reliability Program for Space Systems, 13 June 2008 (also published as TOR-2007(8583)-6889 under same title) or equivalent; Design Advisory DA-2013-01
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| 2.3.2-5-4 Ensure the hardware/software FMECA is assessed |
Phase A |
Phase B |
Phase C |
Phase D1 |
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Ensure FMECA is based on the physical design of the system, subsystems, and units. Unit FMECAs should be performed on each unit regardless of whether or not the unit or its function is redundant in the system.
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NA
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NA
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SMC-S-013, Reliability Program for Space Systems, 13 June 2008 (also published as TOR-2007(8583)-6889 under same title) or equivalent; Design Advisory DA-2013-01
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| 2.3.2-5-5 Ensure all states and modes tested and verified for acceptable performance |
Phase C |
Phase D1 |
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Ensure the FMECA includes analysis of the Safe Mode design in all applicable subsystems.
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SFWC 2.2.3.4
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NA
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TOR-2009(8591)-13, Space Vehicle Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis; Design Advisory DA-2013-01
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