| 2.3.2-7-1 Ensure accelerated reliability life testing is assessed for adequacy and completeness |
Phase B |
Phase C |
|
Ensure piece part accelerated testing screening models and results are assessed. Perform independent assessment as appropriate.
|
NA
|
NA
|
Mission Assurance Guide, TOR-2007(8546)-6018, Rev B, Reliability Chapter; Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook, TOR-2006(8506)-4494,Chapter 21
|
| 2.3.2-7-2 Ensure reliability life testing is assessed for adequacy and completeness |
Phase B |
Phase C |
|
Ensure unit testing model and results are assessed. Perform independent assessment as appropriate.
|
NA
|
NA
|
Mission Assurance Guide, TOR-2007(8546)-6018, Rev B, Reliability Chapter; Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook, TOR-2006(8506)-4494,Chapter 21
|
| 2.3.2-7-3 Ensure worst-case analysis is assessed for adequacy and completeness |
Phase B |
Phase C |
|
Ensure subsystem, and unit worst case circuit analyses are assessed. Perform independent assessment as appropriate.
|
NA
|
NA
|
Mission Assurance Guide, TOR-2007(8546)-6018, Rev B, Reliability Chapter; Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook, TOR-2006(8506)-4494,Chapter 21; Mission Assurance Guide, TOR-2007(8546)-6018, Rev B, Reliability Chapter; SMC-S-013, Reliability Program for Space Systems, 13 June 2008 (also published as TOR-2007(8583)-6889 under same title) or equivalent; TOR-2011(3905)-9, Procedures for worst-case circuit analysis for space systems.
|
| 2.3.2-7-4 Ensure parts stress analysis is assessed for adequacy, derating criteria and completeness |
Phase B |
Phase C |
|
Ensure parts stress against derating criteria are assessed. Perform independent assessment as appropriate.
|
NA
|
NA
|
Mission Assurance Guide, TOR-2007(8546)-6018, Rev B, Reliability Chapter; Space Vehicle Systems Engineering Handbook, TOR-2006(8506)-4494,Chapter 21; TOR-2006(8583)-5236 rev A, Technical Requirements for Electronic Space Vehicle Parts
|
| 2.3.2-7-5 Ensure manufacturing reliability analysis is assessed |
Phase B |
Phase C |
|
Ensure the hardware is manufactured in a repeatable and verifiable manner for new, unqualified manufacturing processes. Identify any production-critical processes using a FMECA.
|
NA
|
NA
|
SMC-S-013, Reliability Program for Space Systems, 13 June 2008 (also published as TOR-2007(8583)-6889 under same title) or equivalent
|
| 2.3.2-7-6 Ensure Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) complete, as required |
Phase A |
Phase B |
Phase C |
|
Ensure adequacy and completeness of failure investigation Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to ensure root cause of failure is adequately analyzed. Ensure FTA provides the detail analysis that systematically evaluates all possible failures and failure combinations in order to demonstrate root cause of a failure.
|
SFWC 2.2.3.1
|
NA
|
TOR-2009(8591)-13, Space Vehicle Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis ; SMC-S-013, Reliability Program for Space Systems, 13 June 2008 (also published as TOR-2007(8583)-6889 under same title) or equivalent
|